mandare

Mandare

Give your agents a budget they cannot talk their way out of.

Mandare is the accountability stack for AI agent fleets: signed agent identity (Passport), signed machine-readable authority (Mandate), a tamper-evident ledger of what agents actually did (Ledger), an offline kill switch — and external witnessing + public anchoring so ledger history cannot be truncated or rewritten without detection (with the witness on separate infrastructure, not even by the operator — the solo compose stack runs everything on one host and says so). Local-first: raw activity never leaves your machine.

Replay of the captured Demo 1 run (pnpm demo, the no-docker path; the docker quickstart stops at call #24) — the same script CI executes and asserts on every push. Regenerate: node scripts/render-demo-gif.mjs.

Quickstart — 3 commands, no API keys needed

Needs Docker with Compose v2 (up --wait needs v2.1.1+). The images build locally on first run, which takes a few minutes.

git clone https://github.com/mandarelabs/mandare && cd mandare

docker compose up -d --wait

docker compose run --rm demo

The demo releases a runaway agent loop against your gateway, priced against a bundled mock provider: the enforcement is real, the money isn't. The €20/day mandate kills it mid-run: 23 calls settle €19.17, call #24's reservation would cross €20 and is refused 403 PER_DAY_EXCEEDED, the refusal is itself a ledger entry, and mandare verify proves chain VALID, counters == replay(ledger), and the witnessed head history covers the chain. Dashboard at http://127.0.0.1:8788. Real providers: put keys in .env (docs).

When you're done, docker compose down -v removes the containers and the demo volumes (mandare-data, mandare-witness-state).

No docker (Node ≥ 22.13 and pnpm 10; if pnpm is missing, install.sh runs corepack enable, a global change):

./install.sh

pnpm demo

(pnpm demo runs a cheaper model and raises the gateway's default 60 calls/minute velocity limit so the budget is the only limit in play: 71 calls, call #72 refused at the same €20 cap. The docker demo above runs the stack's real defaults.)

pnpm demo runs without a witness, so mandare verify there can't see entries dropped from the end of the ledger — refusals included — unless you pass a saved --prev-head. The docker stack runs a witness, and pnpm demo:witness shows it catching exactly that.

Or from npm (CLI + MCP server, no checkout; the MCP server reads the ledger at MANDARE_LEDGER_DB, default ./mandare-ledger.db):

npm i -g @mandarelabs/cli && mandare help

npx -y @mandarelabs/mcp-server

Where state lands: the CLI's vault (./mandare-vault.db, used by passport issue and vault …) keeps its master key in the OS keychain by default; passport issue writes the agent's credential and key under ~/.mandare/agents/ by default; and unless MANDARE_VAULT=1, the door's private key sits next to the ledger (<ledger>.doorkey.pem, mode 0600).

Proofs, not data

Raw prompts and responses never leave your machine. What crosses a trust boundary is only ever a proof: salted tree heads to the witness, an integrity certificate to an auditor, a revocation bitstring to a verifier.

 agent (any SDK, base URL → the door)
   │  RFC 9421-signed request (passport)   or scoped PoP token
   ▼
 ┌──────────────── gateway door ────────────────┐
 │ kill-check → policy (mandate: caps/window/   │     ┌─ witness (external) ─┐
 │ scope/approval) → INTENT entry (reserves     │────▶│ salted head history, │
 │ cost in the ledger tx) → provider → RESULT   │ acks│ consistency-enforced,│
 │ entry (settles true cost)                    │◀────│ public anchor (OTS)  │
 └───────────────┬──────────────────────────────┘     └──────────────────────┘
                 ▼
        append-only ledger (SQLite/Postgres)
        hash-chained · door-signed · RFC 6962 tree
        budget counters + revocation = PROJECTIONS (replay-checkable)
                 ▼
   mandare verify · certify (third-party checkable) · dashboard · kill

Every door obeys three rules: fail-closed on spend, log-before-act, and agent input is hostile. Refusals are ledger entries — the system keeps its no's, and a witness keeps them from being quietly dropped.

The five demos are the acceptance tests (CI runs all of them)

#	Claim	Run
1	A runaway loop dies at €20, with proof	pnpm demo
2	A stolen token is dead paper; kill bites mid-task	pnpm demo:dead-paper
3	One signed mandate replaces 40 prompts; humans approve async	pnpm demo:mandate
4	The card declines AT THE NETWORK; one cap governs both rails	pnpm demo:card
5	Truncation and rewrites can't hide from an independent witness (verified with the door key held out-of-band)	pnpm demo:witness

Each demo also exists as a self-contained, narrated scenario in examples/ — the story, the real captured output, and the code to read next.

Integrations

Surface	Where	What
TypeScript SDK	packages/sdk (Apache-2.0)	A signed fetch for your existing Anthropic/OpenAI SDK (token PoP + passport RFC 9421)
Python client	packages/sdk-py (Apache-2.0)	Zero-dependency token-mode client (stdlib only)
MCP server	packages/mcp-server	The door as MCP tools: verify, budgets, issuance, kill — stdio, env-configured
OpenClaw skill	integrations/openclaw	Native AgentSkills skill (also works in Claude Code): budget awareness, honest refusals, proofs, kill
Self-host	compose.yaml + install.sh	gateway + witness + dashboard, no secrets needed for dry-run
Dashboard	apps/dashboard	Local-first fleet view over the ledger; zero telemetry
Docs	apps/docs → mandare.dev	Quickstart, concepts, threat model, reference

Security & provenance

• Adversarially reviewed before launch — by AI, not yet by an external auditor: four parallel AI-assisted review passes (crypto/integrity · spend/enforcement · packaging/supply-chain · docs-vs-claims) were prompted to break the system. 15 findings — 3 HIGH — all fixed with regression tests or documented as accepted residuals, none silent. Full report: docs/SECURITY-REVIEW-S8.md, including what was probed and held, the honest residuals, and the target list for the external audit. A second AI-assisted audit pass (2026-09) found further spend, witnessing and packaging defects; their fixes and red-team cases are logged in TASKS.md (S10-fix 2A–2D). The external audit is still pending.
• Fail-closed by construction: no mandate → no spend; ledger down → no action; witness dead → high-value actions refuse (the kill switch never depends on anything remote).
• Red-team suites run in CI (rule R5): edit/delete/truncate/rollback/ replay/forge on SQLite AND Postgres, token theft + replay, signature coverage attacks, webhook forgery, budget races, witness split-view — and they may never be weakened to make a change pass.
• Supply chain: pnpm 10 with install scripts off, 3-day dependency cooldown, frozen lockfiles, hand-rolled security primitives pinned to official test vectors where they exist (RFC 6962 CT vectors, did:key/base58) and otherwise tested against the published wire scheme with adversarial round-trip suites (Stripe signatures, OpenTimestamps). From launch: npm Trusted Publishing (OIDC provenance), cosign-signed images, signed skill envelopes. Honest reproducibility bar in REPRODUCING.md.
• Verify without trusting us: the verifier, passport, and witness protocol are Apache-2.0 and embeddable; mandare certify produces integrity certificates a third party checks with no ledger access.
• Vulnerabilities: see SECURITY.md (private reporting, safe harbor, 90-day disclosure).

License

AGPL-3.0-only, except the embeddable packages listed in LICENSING.md (spec, policy-engine, verifier, passport, witness-protocol, sdk, sdk-py — Apache-2.0). The split is permanent; we do not relicense.